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Race, Ethnicity and Culture  
Roger Ballard 
The words race, ethnicity and culture and their various derivatives are all very familiar: 
indeed the terms race and culture, if not ethnicity, are regularly used in everyday speech. Yet 
just what do they actually mean? Are they merely synonyms for one another, are do they 
point to very different dimensions of the social order? Although there can be little doubt that 
the social phenomena with respect to which these terms are deployed issues are amongst 
those of the most pressing socio-political importance in the contemporary world, a little 
reflection soon reveals that their precise meaning is still surrounded by clouds of conceptual 
confusion. Nor is this confusion limited to popular discourse: sociologists hardly do much 
better. This is most alarming. If n social scientists lack an analytical vocabulary whose 
meanings are broadly agreed upon, there is little prospect of them being able to construct 
viable descriptions – let alone insightful explanations – of the phenomena they are seeking to 
understand, no matter how much the streets may be riven by ‘race riots’, no matter how many 
holocausts may be precipitated by processes of ‘ethnic cleansing’, and no matter how many 
aircraft may be flown straight into skyscrapers. In the absence of an appropriate analytical 
vocabulary not only will the prospect of our being able to comprehend the processes give rise 
to such confrontations be severely inhibited, but the prospects our being able to identify the 
best means of resolving the underlying problems will remain remote.  
 
With such challenges in mind, this Chapter has a straightforward agenda. Firstly to identify 
how the terms race, ethnicity and culture are currently used in popular discourse – and the 
significance of these usages; secondly to identify how each of these terms can best be defined 
in technical terms, such that they can be turned into more precise – and hence more effective 
– vehicles for sociological analysis; and thirdly to explore the ways in which a more carefully 
constructed analytical vocabulary can enable us to gain a clearer grasp of just how a whole 
series of pressing contemporary problems have arisen – and how they might realistically be 
resolved.   
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1 Race and Racism 
To what extent is the term race a meaningful analytical category? The use of its derivatives 
racism and racist is routinely regarded as morally challenging, and it is easy to see why. 
Racism is not regarded as just another ideological outlook like liberalism, conservatism and 
so forth: instead it is regarded as a manifestation of profound moral inadequacy. As a result it 
has become a term of abuse. Since racism is understood as intrinsically evil, charges of 
racism can be deployed as an unchallengeable moralistic sledgehammer. Nevertheless it is 
one which is comparatively easy to dodge. Those whose views reek with xenophobic 
chauvinism have long since learned to preface their arguments with statements about how 
much they abhor racism, after which they go on to make all manner of scurrilous criticisms of 
the behaviour of people of colour, and the extent to which such practices are undermining the 
established order of civilization. This leaves an easy way open for developing arguments in 
which they insist that they are not racists but patriots who dare to confront the issues which 
our wishy-washy liberal opponents – caught up as they are in political correctness – dare not 
even acknowledge. 
 
Yet even if we sidestep the fruitless ping-pong of morally outraged accusations and counter-
accusations into which such arguments soon descend, just what do the terms race, racism and 
racist actually mean? Just how should they be deployed – if indeed they should be deployed 
at all – in the context of sociological analysis? And if so, just when, where, why and how? To 
be sure we are free to define our analytical categories in any way in which we see fit, for as 
Alice quite rightly insisted, words can mean whatever we say they mean, neither more nor 
less. Nevertheless common sense suggest that we should pay at least some attention to 
popular understandings, although in the process of so doing we should never overlook the 
insights generated by those working in other spheres of scientific endeavour.  
 
If, therefore, we begin at the beginning, there can be little dispute that the term race is that it 
has something to do with ancestry, with descent, and yet more precisely still, with heredity. 
In that sense ‘race’ is (or at least appears to be) an aspect of – or at least a consequence of – 
human genetics. Nevertheless the term is actually used in two quite contradictory senses. On 
the one hand it can be used to highlight emphasise the common genetic characteristics of the 
entire spectrum of humankind – as in the phrase ‘the human race’. On the other it can also be 
deployed in quite the opposite sense: to highlight supposed categorical differences between 
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different sub-sections of homo sapiens, as in phrases such as ‘the European race’, the 
‘African race’. The social connotations of these two perspectives are also mirror images of 
one another. Whilst the first underlines our common humanity, the second points suggests 
that there are immutable differences between different subsections of humanity. Nor is that 
all. Building on the second theme, popular usage suggests the innate capabilities of different 
racial groups can be placed in hierarchical series in which with the more ‘advanced’ 
capabilities stand at the top of a ranked scale which ranges all the way down to those with 
most limited and hence ‘primitive’ capabilities who stand tight at the bottom.  
 
It is also worth noting that such hierarchies can be constructed in variety of different ways. 
Hence, for example, those seeking to defend themselves against charges of racism frequently 
respond by insisting that there is no substance to any moralistic criticisms directed at them, 
since they very positively appreciate the extent to which people of African origin have 
dramatically greater capabilities as athletes, footballers, popular musicians and so forth. That 
said, no prizes are on offer for correctly identifying which ‘racial’ group’s members routinely 
regard themselves as having intellectual, cultural, artistic, scientific and technological 
capabilities which are comprehensively superior to those of anyone else – albeit at the cost of 
having lost the peak of their potential physical and libidinous capacity which they once 
possessed, or so they also fantasise, way back in the mists of their primitive past (Ballard 
1997: 40). Arguments about the relative capabilities of different ‘racial’ groups have had, and 
continue to have, powerful social consequences. But just how sound are the conceptual 
foundations on which they rest? Are the fact or are the fiction? 
1.1 The human race 
Here we can usefully turn to biology, and especially to human genetics for specialist advice. 
As far as the unity of humankind is concerned, scientific observation confirms that homo 
sapiens is a single species. To be sure there all manner of local variations within the species, 
most of which appear to have emerged in the course of many generations of adaptive 
response to residence in specific habitats; moreover at least some of these adaptations have 
precipitated more or less observable variations in physical appearance. Nevertheless human 
beings of all kinds, colours and appearances can successfully inter-breed with one another,  
and the offspring of all such unions are themselves fertile: these are precisely the criteria 
which biologist use to identify whether or not a given population constitutes a single species. 
Nevertheless recent advances in our understanding of the role of DNA in organising heredity 
 4
has radically advanced our understanding of population genetics. In particular accurate 
measurements of the extent of genetic variation as between different populations – or as the 
geneticists put it, between different breeding pools – can now be made. Such studies have yet 
again confirmed that at a global level the extent of the genetic differences between such 
breeding pools is minute as compared with the commonalties between them. Since we are 
much more similar than we are different, human genetic homogeneity at a global level must 
now be regarded as an unquestionable reality. 
 
Yet although homo sapiens constitutes a single race in this sense, can its members still be 
divided into clearly marked genetically distinctive subgroups, as the second dimension of 
popular understanding of the term race suggests? It is easy to see why there might be some 
substance to such a hypothesis, for there can be no doubt that there are all sorts genetically 
precipitated differences as between various human populations. Members of some groups are 
exceedingly pale-skinned, whilst others are naturally endowed with the kind of skin 
colouration which many members of the first group are currently prepared to spend huge 
sums on sun lamps, or better still on lengthy holidays in the Caribbean, in order to acquire. 
The genetic heritage of some other groups produces an additional epicanthic fold in the upper 
eyelid, such that their eyes are distinctively almond-shaped, and for whose removal some 
people are prepared to pay equally large sums to plastic surgeons. Other populations have a 
high gene frequency for sickle cell anaemia and/or thalassemia: mutations which renders 
heterozygotic carriers resistant to malaria, but have fatal consequences for homozygotes;1 and 
in Britain that section of the population which is of Celtic carry the gene which causes cystic 
fibrosis at an exceptionally high frequency, precipitating yet another condition which is fatal 
amongst homozygotes, although in this case the gene brings no known advantage to its 
heterozygotic carriers.2  
 
Clearly there is a limited degree of genetic diversity within the overall condition of 
homogeneity which is characteristic of the species homo sapiens.  But are these sufficiently 
large and clear cut to render talk of human races legitimate? 
                                                 
1 A homozygote is a person who has received identical copies of a gene for a specific trait from both parents; a 
heterozygote receives that gene from only one parent. If heterozygotes mate, 25% of their offspring will (on 
average) be homozygotes, 50% will be heterozygotes , and 25% will be entirely clear of the trait.  
2 By contrast the epicanthic fold appears to be an adaptive response to extreme cold, whilst pale skins may well 
be a similarly adaptive response to low levels UV radiation in the northern hemisphere. 
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1.2 Racial diversity 
One of the abiding sources of analytical difficulty in this sphere is that biological differences 
of this kind are by no means the only source of human diversity: indeed in comparison with 
the combined impact of social, cultural, political and economic factors on human diversity, 
the impact of biological factors is relatively small. There is also a further complication: the 
widespread human tendency to attribute hereditary causes to differing outcomes which are in 
fact politically and socio-economically precipitated. As one might expect, the beneficiaries of 
such processes invariably find it extremely convenient to explain – or rather more accurately, 
to explain away – all such inequalities as having been biologically precipitated, so enabling 
them to press to one side any suggestion that their own exploitative activities might have 
played a part in precipitating those outcomes. Needless to say those on the receiving end of 
such treatment invariably vigorously contest that kind of perspective. Instead they point out – 
often with considerable asperity – that such arguments are no more than a convenient fiction 
used by their oppressors as a means of brushing their exploitative practices under the carpet. 
 
In the midst of such territory, we must clearly proceed with great care. If we are exploring the 
impact of racial diversity in biological terms, it follows that we must restrict our analysis to 
those features of human diversity which are indisputably biologically precipitated. Likewise 
we must carefully differentiate this activity from parallel explorations of the way in which 
other aspects of human social and behavioural diversity have been explained in terms of 
theories which are believed to be biological sound, but where those beliefs no foundation 
whatsoever in biological science. Moreover in doing so we also need to remember that 
biological knowledge has moved on by leaps and bounds during the course of the two 
centuries, such that scientifically tested hypotheses have gradually replaced often-erroneous 
speculation.  
1.3 Darwin and Social Darwinism 
The most salient consequences of these developments are clear enough3. In the first flush of 
excitement following Darwin’s articulation of his ground-breaking hypothesis that speciation 
could best be explained as the outcome of processes natural selection, such that mutations 
which were positively adaptive to specific environmental niches gradually became ever more 
salient in any given breeding population, many of those inspired Darwin’s arguments also 
                                                 
3 For an excellent review of the issues, see Banton, The idea of race, 1977 
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went on to suggest that all the varied forms of social, cultural, political and religious practice 
found in contemporary human societies were the outcome of similar evolutionary processes. 
Had the social Darwinists recognised that these variations were not only the outcome of 
processes cultural adaptation to the challenges thrown up in differing socio-economic and 
environmental contexts, but were also socially transmitted, they might also have made some 
equally ground-breaking sociological advances. But unfortunately they made a series of very 
serious mistake. Firstly they failed to recognise that there was a crucial distinction between 
biological and social processes, most particularly in the way in which the information in 
genetic as opposed to social and cultural codes is transmitted from generation to generation; 
and secondly by assuming that the results of these processes could socio-cultural 
differentiation could be arranged along a straightforward hierarchy in which certain societies 
(those which the classifiers identified as more progressive and civilised) could be identified 
as having made the ‘right’ evolutionary choices, whilst the ancestors of all others (those 
which the classifiers identified as less advanced, less progressive and hence more ‘primitive’)  
had – sad to say – made the wrong choices.  
 
It is worth noting that this intrinsically hierarchical vision of human evolution stood 
comprehensively at odds with Darwin’s crucial insight that each species represented the 
outcome of a positive adaptation to a specific ecological niche, it was nevertheless an 
explanatory hypothesis which was received with acclaim by most of the inhabitants late 
nineteenth century Euro-America. It is easy to see why. Such theories provided apparently 
unchallengeable ‘scientific’ support for the view that European people, together with their 
preferred religious, cultural and social institutions, were intrinsically superior to and certainly 
more advanced than those of the ‘primitive’ peoples over whom they were so busy extending 
their colonial dominance. Since scientific progress so neatly legitimated all their activities, it 
should come as no surprise that the principal beneficiaries of processes of European Imperial 
expansion should have welcomed social Darwinism with such enthusiasm, or that they should 
have put so much effort into passing on their hegemonic ideological insights to their 
‘primitive’ subjects, at whose expense they were forging so rapidly ahead.  
 
Much has changed since support for social Darwinism reached its apogee at the end of the 
nineteenth century. In the first place it is now virtually universally recognised – except by a 
tiny ardent rear-guard of socio-biologists – that the social and conceptual worlds within 
which humans have constructed around themselves, and within which they conduct their 
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everyday business, are culturally rather than biologically generated and transmitted. Secondly 
it is now equally clear that the human genome is such that members of our species have 
gained a unique capacity to create linguistic and cultural codes in terms of which to create 
conceptual universes of their own, to communicate with one another, and hence to organise 
their interactions, it is the capacity to do so rather than the contents of those codes which is 
biologically transmitted.  
 
Hence whilst the use of language and culture is and long has been both a unique and a 
universal human trait, the specific language (or languages) any given individual speaks, and 
the cultural tradition (or traditions) within which he or she routinely operates is contingent on 
their social experience, and not on their biological decent. People of Chinese ancestry are not 
genetically programmed to speak Chinese, any more than English people are genetically 
programmed to speak English. Our mother tongues are acquired in the process of childhood 
socialisation, not as a consequence of our personal genotype. Hence if an individual of 
Chinese ancestry was by happenstance brought up in an English context, or if someone of 
English ancestry was brought up in a Chinese context, each would speak the language to 
which they had been exposed with equal fluency. Whilst our capacity to be cultured in this 
sense may be as genetically hard-wired as the interior of any computer chip, it nevertheless 
imposes relatively few limitations on the linguistic and cultural software which can be run on 
it. Hence our specific linguistic and cultural competences – our stock of software, as it were – 
is a product of our upbringing and social experience, as well as of our own personal 
creativity, rather than being determined by our biological ancestry.  
 
Much follows from this. Most obviously the Social Darwinists’ attempt to extend biologically 
inspired arguments to explain patterns of human social and cultural differentiation must be 
discarded as comprehensively unsustainable – as must their assumption that there were 
legitimate biological grounds for ranking human societies along a spectrum from ‘primitive’ 
to ‘civilised’. As we noted earlier the theory hierarchy was always suspect even from a 
Darwinian perspective, since he was always far more concerned with adaptation than 
progress. Hence if any attempt is made to represent some societies as being ‘more advanced’ 
than others, it follows that that the whole exercise must stand and fall in terms of its 
sociological and anthropological – rather than its biological – credibility. These issues will be 
considered at length in a later section.  
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1.4 Do ‘races’ exist? 
Yet even if we carefully separate socially and culturally precipitated dimensions of human  
diversity from those which are biologically precipitated, we are still left with forms of 
differentiation which it might seem legitimate to identify as racial. After all nineteenth 
century physical anthropologists spent a great deal of time exploring such diversities on an 
empirical basis. In so doing they produced huge volumes of data on such matters as variations 
in skin pigmentation, the cranial index, the nasal index and the height and slope of the 
forehead as between all manner of human population groups. Might not findings of this kind 
give at least some degree of scientific substance to the biological concept of race?  
 
Let us begin by considering what a viable – but exclusively biologically specified – definition 
of such a phenomenon might be. If was indeed possible to divide homo sapiens into a number 
of biologically distinct subgroups or races, a number of conditions would have to hold. Firstly 
each such group would have to have reasonably clear boundaries, such that the vast majority 
of individuals could reliably be allocated into one such group or another. Secondly, and just 
as importantly, this process of allocation would have to operate in such a way that the same 
persons would end up in the same pigeon-holes, not matter which biological characteristic – 
be it skin colour, blood group or whatever – was used in the allocation process. Only if both 
these criteria could be fulfilled would it be possible confidently to assert that homo sapiens 
can indeed be divided into a number of racially distinctive sub-groups.  
 
Do such racial groups in this biological sense actually exist? Despite the still extremely 
widespread popular view that is meaningful to talk racial groups in this sense, and thus to act 
on the assumption that they do (which is, of course, another matter altogether), all efforts to 
demonstrate that racial groups in a biological sense can indeed be identified have ended in 
failure. Even though late Victorian physical anthropologists put a great deal of effort into 
acquiring the relevant data, hindsight allows us to observe that there is much that was odd 
about the procedures. Although their efforts had the merit of being grounded in empirical 
observation rather than on the armchair theorising favoured by the Social Darwinists, and 
although many of the characteristics on which they focussed are very largely genetically 
controlled, they invariably set out to measure the patently visible aspects of human 
difference, and especially those which manifested themselves in the facial and cranial region. 
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In other words they focussed on precisely those parts of the body on which humans 
concentrate when engaged in social acts of recognition. 
 
From the point of view biological taxonomy, however, all physical traits are of equal 
significance, and from that perspective the nineteenth obsession with physiognomy was 
clearly wholly arbitrary. Moreover since then we have learned a great deal about another 
source of human variation which, although invisible, is nevertheless just as comprehensively 
controlled by genetic factors: blood groups. Moreover because these have to be carefully 
matched if transfusions are to be successful, it is easy to gain access to an immense amount of 
data on the subject, much of which can also be straightforwardly classified in terms of the 
population group from which the donor was recruited. It is studies of this data which have 
tolled the death knell for classical race theory.  
 
In his massive global study The history and geography of human genes, Cavalli-Sforza 
(1994) shows why this is so. Although he demonstrates that there are indeed all manner of 
spatial variations in the distribution specific genes, he makes two crucial points. Firstly that 
all these variations are clinal in character: as a result there are no clear cut boundaries 
between this populations which possess or lack any given gene.4 Secondly, and even more 
fatally for classical race theory, the clinal distributions for almost all of almost the genes 
which he has so far been able to examine (and there are many more which it would be equally 
reasonably to consider) display very little spatial congruence.5 Hence whilst Cavalli-Sforza 
shows that there is indeed a great deal of local variation in the frequency with which specific 
genes appear, it is equally clear the distribution of these variations is rarely, if ever, congruent 
with the patterns which race-theory predicted.  
 
                                                 
4 A convenient way of understanding this point is by analogy with the distribution of isobars – lines joining 
points of equal barometric pressure – on weather maps. Although the isobars serve to map out areas of high 
pressure, low pressure and so forth, there are no sharp disjunctions between high and low, only more or less 
steep inclines between them. In other words pressure variation is clinal. The distribution ‘isogenes’ (although 
that is not in fact the term used by population geneticists to describe them) which join points at which there is an 
identical frequency of incidence of a specific gene or genetic mutuation within the local population can also be 
mapped out in just the same way. This procedure generates patterns which are very similar in character to those 
found on weather maps.  
5 The best way of comprehending this point is by imagining that one obtained weather maps for the north 
Atlantic  which had been collected at a monthly intervals over a six month period. Each map will show a clear 
pattern of highs and lows – although with inclines rather than step-boundaries between them. Now imagine all 
the maps are superimposed over one another; there will clearly be very little congruence between the patterns 
found at each level. A comparison of ‘isogene’ maps reveals a similar lack of congruence.  
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If population genetics provides no evidence to support the suggestion that homo sapiens can 
be divided into a number of clearly differentiated sub-groups, it follows that human races in 
the sense in which they are still understood in popular discourse must now be regarded as 
nothing more than a figment of the imagination.  
 
Lets us be quite clear what all this means. Cavalli-Sforza is not, of course, suggesting that 
there are no biological differences both within and as between all manner of human 
population groups. Of course there are. Although there is always a substantial degree of 
variation around the mean, the members of some local population groups manifestly have 
much paler skins than others; in some groups broad noses are frequent, whilst in others 
narrow noses are the norm; in some populations group blood group A is commonplace, whilst 
in others it is extremely rare; members of some populations are particularly well adapted to 
cope with artic conditions, whilst others – those who have lived as herdsmen for many 
millennia, for example – may well have developed a body structure which makes them 
exceptionally capable long-distance runners. Such variations – and there are clearly many 
more – are real. Where race theory was mistaken was in its assumption that all these 
variations were necessarily congruent with one another, such that all people with black skin 
would by definition also have wide noses, advanced athletic (and sexual) capabilities, and a 
correspondingly limited intellectual capacity. Racial groups in that sense are no more than a 
figment of fevered imaginations: they are not a biological reality. 
 
However the fact that these fantasies can now be shown to have no grounding in scientific 
biology does not prevent them being acted upon. Quite the contrary. If such ‘races’ in the 
classic sense are believed to exist, and if actions are regularly taken on the basis of those 
beliefs, the social consequences can be only too real. European Jews may or may not have 
been a racial group in a biological sense, but that did not prevent millions of them being 
consigned to the gas chamber on ‘racial’ grounds. People of African or Asian descent may or 
may not belong to distinctive racial groups in a biological sense, but this does not prevent 
people of European descent from regarding the alterity6 displayed by people of colour as an 
                                                 
6 Alterity is in effect a more latin synonym for a much more familiar anglo-saxon term: otherness. In this 
context, however, I deploy the term alterity to highlight a tendency very frequently displayed in context of racial 
and ethnic polarisation – the tendency of those involved to attribute all things evil and negative to the otherness/ 
alterity of their rivals. This tendency is invariably accompanied by several powerful sub-texts. In the first place 
those who adopt such a view implicitly identify their own self-perecived characteristics as wholly and 
wonderfully positive (see Ballard 1996); secondly this process most usually works both ways, such that each 
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indication of comprehensive social and intellectual inferiority, so justifying all the actions 
they consequently take to exclude such persons from scarce resources. Race may indeed be a 
fiction, but as long as people who regard themselves as ‘white’ treat those with a hereditary 
skin colouration which is significantly darker than theirs as aliens, racism will remain a very 
concrete social reality. So, too, will its consequences. If one section of the population uses 
skin colour in this way they will not only have begun to construct an exclusive fence around 
their own position of privilege, but by erecting those social barriers they will also – by 
definition – impose sorts of unwelcome social and economic handicaps on those with the 
misfortune to stand outside it.   
2 Culture  
Whilst ‘race’ – if the phenomenon it exists at all – is best understood as an aspect of a 
person’s biological and hence genetic heritage, both culture and language (for the two 
phenomena are closely akin to one another) are socially transmitted. Hence whilst our unique 
capacity to construct our own linguistic and cultural codes is genetically hard-wired into our 
very being, this is emphatically not the case with respect to the content of the codes which 
each of us actually deploys. Hence a child born to European parents who was by some 
happenstance brought up by foster parents in rural China would grow up speaking fluent 
Chinese, and with as much facility in Chinese cultural styles as their step-brothers and step-
sisters who were genetically wholly Chinese. The same would also be true the other way 
round – even if in physical terms both might stick out like ugly ducklings. So in addition to 
one’s physical appearance, it is the capacity to deploy speech as a mode of communication, 
and a similar ability (and indeed expectation) to code one’s behaviour in cultural terms which 
is hereditarily transmitted – not the actual content of the language or the culture in terms of 
which we learn to operate. Such codes are acquired as a product of social experience, and not 
as a result of biological heredity. 
 
It is also worth noting that culture does not code behaviour per se, but rather the rules and 
conventions in terms of which such behaviour is organised. Hence just as the path-breaking 
linguist de Saussure (1960) taught us the difference between langue (the grammatical and 
                                                                                                                                                        
party develops an equally negative image of its alters; thirdly the largely fictious judgements thereby 
constructed can have yet more serious consequences when they are surretiously incorporated into sociological 
discourse. Hence far from being a form of pathogenic ‘deviance’, the alterity of those disregarded others often 
turns out, on closer inspection, to be a highly positive source of strength.  
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lexical principles around which any given language is constructed) from parole (an actual 
stream of speech which has been ordered on the basis of those principles), so it is equally 
important to distinguish culture from behaviour.  
 
Just as with speech, all behaviour is coded: not only are both sets of activities ordered in 
terms of a specific code, but unless the hearer/observer has access to the relevant code they 
will not be in a position accurately to interpret what is being communicated – or indeed to 
decide whether the signals being transmitted are coherent and hence meaningful, or whether 
they are merely a jumble of incoherent and meaningless white noise. What is also extremely 
striking is just how immensely varied such codes can be. It therefore follows that linguistic 
and cultural variations are a much more substantial source of differentiation as been human 
populations than are the relatively low-key genetic variations discussed in the previous 
section.  
2.1 Cultures as cognitive structures 
Human cultures are cognitive structures; and since culture also provides a vehicle for 
communication, the phenomenon is best understood as the set of ideas, values and 
understandings which people deploy within a specific network of social relationships use as a 
means of ordering their inter-personal interactions and hence to generate ties of reciprocity 
between themselves; in so doing it also provides the principal basis on which human beings 
give meaning and purpose to lives. Culture – like language – is the foundation for the worlds 
of meaning which we create around ourselves. But such meanings are never self-evident: they 
are always culturally coded. It follows that those who are not familiar with the relevant code 
will always have difficulty in making accurate sense of what is going on. Just as human 
speech is incomprehensible to listeners who are unfamiliar with the linguistic code being 
used by the speaker, so too with behaviour. Whilst one can always attempt to “read” 
behaviour in terms of a more familiar code of one’s own, any observer who is naïve enough 
to do so necessarily imposes his or her own interpretation on what has been observed. Those 
who deploy such a strategy – whether they do so consciously or not – may well feel quite  
satisfied with their own ‘understanding’ of what they have observed, no matter how 
comprehensively they have misapprehended the purposes and intentions of those whose 
behaviour they have observed. 
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Whilst human beings are unique in being able to create the terms of their own existence, the 
actual content of the cultures they have constructed in so doing are as diverse – no less in 
their grammar than in their vocabulary – than are human languages; and since almost every 
aspect of our behaviour is culturally conditioned, it follows that ‘normality’ is an extremely 
elusive concept. Just which forms of behaviour are considered normal and conventional – and 
which are considered to be disturbed and disturbing – varies enormously from context to 
context. There are few, if any, universally applicable yardsticks. 
 
Cultural systems are not God-given: rather they are always and everywhere the creation of 
their users. As a result they are never fixed and static, but are constantly being rejigged, 
reinterpreted and indeed reinvented by their users. In that respect processes of cultural change 
are simply a mark of human creativity. New ideas, new perceptions, new inventions and new 
fashions frequently spread like wildfire, no matter how ‘remote’ observers in the Euro-
American metropolis may regard the contexts within which these developments are taking 
place as being. That said, changing environmental circumstances – which are often 
precipitated by the intrusive activities of distant others – are always powerful driving force 
towards cultural change, if only because every culture is at heart a strategic solution to a 
particular set of material circumstances. However it should never be forgotten that there are 
innumerable equally viable solutions to any given environmental challenge. Every cultural 
system may indeed be a strategic response to a given set of circumstances, but the 
relationship between circumstances and solution is never deterministic. Culture, no less than 
language, is an autonomous human construct. Although contextually responsive, it cannot be 
reduced to anything else.  
2.2 Culture and Power 
Whilst every cultural system is positively adaptive as far as its users are concerned, observers 
invariably perceive those deployed by those unlike themselves as being bizarre at best, and at 
worst as wholly misguided. Those fortunate enough to occupy positions of socio-economic 
and political privilege are particularly likely to take such judgements to heart. By routinely 
adopting the view that their own cultural premises are intrinsically superior to those deployed 
by everyone else, it appears that it is precisely their use of those values which has enabled 
them to gain, and to maintain, their position of privilege. To those safely entrenched within 
such a position, it seems quite self-evident that the cultural systems deployed by others are 
not only inferior to their own, but also that their social subordinates’ positions of poverty and 
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powerlessness are no more than the inevitable result of their relative ‘primitiveness’, 
‘backwardness’ and general lack of civilisation.  
 
Hegemony is therefore best defined as the outcome of a process in which members of a 
dominant group use such ethnocentric judgements to justify their own position of socio-
economic privilege, and simultaneously to explain – or rather to explain away – the 
disprivileged position of those others on whose successful exploitation their own position of 
socio-economic advantage is in fact grounded. Imperial elites, class elites, racial elites, ethnic 
elites and gender elites all routine adopted such neatly self-justifying hegemonic arguments. 
Those who create such structures around themselves are invariably extremely reluctant to 
acknowledge the extent to which they are operating with the context of a self-justifying 
ideological framework of their own making. So long as they are able to identify their own 
perspective as the epitome of universal values of justice, civilisation, freedom and fair play, 
the prospect of their being able to acknowledge that the terms on which they insist on 
engaging with the rest of the world are grounded in a specific, and hence non-universal, set of 
cultural assumptions will remain remote.  
 
Face to face encounters with those who differ rarely serve to dislodge these comfortable 
assumptions. Those who occupy a position of hegemony normally make few if any effort to 
familiarise themselves with – let alone to respect – the linguistic and cultural practices of 
their ‘barbarian’ subordinates. This is not necessarily a view that the ‘barbarians’ share. But 
although they may consequently dismiss these hegemonic assumptions with the contempt 
they deserve, the plain fact is that if they are to have any kind of interaction with their 
dominators they have little practical alternative but to do so on their dominators’ own terms. 
This has several consequences. In the first place those who stand on the other side of the 
fence are normally infinitely more familiar with the culture and linguistic practices of their 
dominators than their dominators are with theirs. But this can also leave the powerless 
confronting a severe dilemma. Are their own preferred linguistic and cultural traditions really 
as inferior as their dominators invariably insist, or is that judgement merely a ploy, actively 
promulgated to persuade their subordinates of the justice and inevitability of their 
subordination? On the face of it the answers to all such questions should be quite self-evident, 
but for one crucial factor: the intensity of the efforts which dominators invariably put into 
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persuading those whom they dominate that their personal, linguistic and cultural capabilities 
really are comprehensively inferior to their own.  
Albert Memmi provides an extremely insightful analysis of the psychological dynamics of 
these tangled processes when he argues that  
“Ultimately, the feeling of guilt is one of the most powerful engines of the racist 
operation. Racism presents itself as one of the primary means of combating all forms 
of remorse. That is why both privelidge and oppression make such heavy use of it. If 
oppression exists, someone has to be blamed for it; and if the oppressor will not own 
up to it himself, which would be intolerable, then the blame must fall on the 
oppressed. In short, racism is a form of charging the oppressed for the crimes, 
whether actual of the potential, of the oppressor”. (italics in the original, Memmi 
2000: 139)  
Moreover if that was not preposterous enough, the circle can be fully sealed if the oppressed 
can be persuaded – or in practice can be ‘educated’ – into accepting their own inferiority, 
such that they begin constantly, and gratefully, to apologise their dominators about the 
consequences of their own supposed genetic and cultural inadequacies.  
Far fetched though that outcome may initially seem to be, the pressure on the excluded to act 
and think in this way is frequently so intense, and so deeply institutionalised that it it does 
indeed produce the desired results. The results of all this are far-reaching. The more 
comprehensively the oppressed can be persuaded to conspire in their own oppression – and 
the principal contemporary means of doing so is by carefully embedding a commitment to the 
innate superiority of the values and beliefs of the locally dominant group at the heart of every 
educational system – the more comprehensively dis-empowered members of the dominated 
group will steadily become. Hence as Steve Biko (1987) so memorably put it, “the greatest 
weapon in the hand of the oppressor is the mind of the oppressed”. By the same token – as 
Biko goes on to argue – retaining (or when the process is really deeply entrenched, by 
regaining) the capacity to think for oneself on one’s own terms is the first and most necessary 
step towards re-gaining the capacity to resist the persistent impact of such hegemonic 
processes. 
2.3 Can cultural systems be ranked? 
Under the influence of social Darwinism, late nineteenth century social theorists devoted an 
immense amount of time an effort into the construction of evolutionary hierarchies. The 
schemes which they developed were legion. In politics, it was argued that there was a 
necessary progressive movement from tyranny through oligarchy to monarchy and ultimately 
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to democracy; kinship theorists argued that there had been a necessary progression from 
group marriage through polygamy to monogamy, accompanied by a parallel movement from 
matriarchy to patriarchy;  theorists of religion staked out a similar process of development 
from animism through polytheism to monotheism, and if they were daring enough, through to 
scientific atheism. Amongst the most influential of these schemes was one devised by Karl 
Marx. Arguing that it was processes of dialectical materialism which provided the driving 
force behind historical development, he outlined a sweeping theory of history in which the 
social order had moved inexorably forward from its initial condition of primitive communism 
through feudalism to capitalism and bourgeois liberalism, which would in turn necessarily be 
replace – or so he predicted – by socialism and ultimately communism. In other words the 
evolutionary hierarchies of racial, cultural and social evolution devised during the nineteenth 
century were all constructed on a similar basis.  
 
What are we to make of all this as we enter the twenty first century? Whilst there can be little 
doubt about the idealism of many of those who constructed these schemas, nor about the 
popular appeal of their ‘progressive’ theories, the whole exercise was nevertheless grounded 
in several fatal flaws. Most obviously there was very little empirical evidence to support 
these theories of history: at best they were rooted in conjectural history – imaginative 
accounts of what the human past must surely have been like. However there was another way 
in which what was taken to be empirical evidence could be wheeled in to support of these 
theories. Given the immense influence of social Darwinism, it seemed self-evident that those 
human cultures and societies which differed markedly from those of which the constructors 
of these theories were drawn – such as those located in those parts of the globe which Euro-
American were busy incorporating into their ever-expanding Empires – were at an earlier and 
more ‘primitive’ state of evolution.  
 
From there on in, the path led downhill all the way. Not only could the very alterity of the 
non-European world be ‘discovered’ and exhibited, so providing endless empirical grist for 
the mills of those constructing evolutionary hierarchies, but the whole enterprise could also 
be deployed to provide moral justification for all aspects of Imperial expansion. If European 
styles, values and assumptions – or in other words the whole gamut of Western European 
social, linguistic, religious and cultural conventions – had been ‘scientifically’ proved to be 
the acme of civilization, it followed that the logic Imperialism could now be comprehensively 
redefined. No longer a process of conquest, it could now be represented as a civilizing 
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mission, under whose aegis all manner of barbarities practiced by the ‘primitive’ peoples who 
had could now be justified. A new conceptual order had been constructed. Not only was the 
validity of cultural ranking taken for granted, but European values – and even more 
specifically the values and the fantasies aristocratic gentlemen intellectuals of northern 
European descent – were placed right at the peak of the new hierarchical vision. Meanwhile 
everyone else trailed more or less distantly down its lower slopes.  
 
Of course most of those hierarchical schemas – at least in their more explicit formats – have 
long since been discarded as mistaken and unsupportable by the great majority of social 
scientists. But the ideas which underpinned these schemas still live on in two crucial ways. 
On the one hand they have remained embedded, albeit in a somewhat diluted format, at the 
very core of Euro-American popular culture.7 This is hardly surprising. Not only were such 
ideas explicitly articulated in school curricula for the best part of a century, but when they 
were eventually withdrawn they were rarely, if ever, directly challenged. And to the extent 
that they continue to serve a valuable ideological purpose it is hardly surprising that such 
ideas still live on in the popular imagination, regardless of the fact that they are no longer 
receive the enthusiastic academic endorsement that they once did. However the second route 
along which echoes of Victorian progressivism have been sustained is not only altogether 
more subtle, but reached into the heart of academia itself. Whilst the greater part of the 
academic establishment has by now comprehensively disengaged itself from the worst 
excesses of Social Darwinism, it is now becoming clear that one of its core assumptions – a  
commitment to the inevitability of unilineal progressivism – still lies buried at the heart of the 
received understandings of most liberal thinkers.  
2.4 Cultural pluralism 
As John Gray (2000) has recently argued at some length, whilst the liberal premises around 
which the greater part of contemporary theorisation in sociology, social policy and political 
science have been constructed are ostensibly extremely critical of any perspective which 
positively evaluates any form of institutionalised social hierarchy – and consequently to most 
aspects of the Social Darwinist program – those premises still provide ready-made 
houseroom to one key aspect of that vision of progressive social evolution. This is the notion 
                                                 
7 Perhaps the best way of checking this out is by exploring the way in which Hollywood has routinely treated 
these issues, all the way from Westerns to Tarzan. And even though some recent products such as Dancing with 
Wolves may appear to have reversed the format, the hero of the whole enterprise is still invariably a European.  
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– which pre-dates the Darwinian revolution, since it can be traced back to the enlightenment 
thinkers of the previous century – that mankind is set on a course rational development which 
will eventually lead to the evolution of to single universally agreed-upon set of values about 
what the good life consists of, and how society can best be structured in order to ensure that 
those values – of freedom, liberty and so forth – can safely be sustained. Hence whilst 
contemporary liberal thinkers routinely highlight their commitment to freedom and personal 
autonomy, for these provide two of the key yardsticks against which they rightly insist that 
the good life should be measured, they nevertheless do so within the context of a very 
specific set of value assumptions around which they also expect that all reasonable others will 
eventually converge.  
 
If so it follows that there is indeed an ideal form of human social organisation which is 
intrinsically superior to all others. To be sure we may not yet have reached goal, or even fully 
identified all of its parameters, whilst some societies (usually those which are ‘less free’) are 
regarded as very considerably further removed from reaching that destination than others. 
Hence whilst that destination may still lie at some distance over the horizon even for the 
inhabitants of the world’s most ‘progressive’ societies, universalism – at least in the sense of 
a universally applicable and agreed upon set of values – still remains a deeply cherished 
liberal goal. As Gray also makes clear this vision of progressive social evolution – now 
largely stripped of the racialised underpinnings which it acquired during the nineteenth 
century – has much older roots than Social Darwinism. Not only can this vision be traced 
back to the idealism of Plato and Socrates, but it was also powerfully reinforced by 
Augustine’s arguments about the duty of all Adam’s offspring to seek to step into the City of 
God, thereby leaving the sinful world of nature far behind them. Many centuries later the 
philosophers of the eighteenth century Enlightenment generated developed similarly 
structured ideas about human perfectibility and progress, albeit with the proviso that the path 
forward was not God-given, but best discerned on the basis of rational analysis and debate.  
 
Yet although it is now increasingly clear that the Social Darwinists’ insistence that biological 
forces were a key component in the whole process was mistaken, rational progressivism – 
now largely stripped of its parasitic biological appendages – has been pressed forward by an 
immensely diverse range of thinkers, from Marx, Durkheim and Weber to Popper, Rawls and 
Dworkin, and most recently of all by the fevered prose of George W. Bush’s speech-writers. 
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Yet just how realistic is prospect of the wonderful goal of universal peace, justice and liberty 
actually being achieved within this much-championed conceptual framework? Is the power of 
its comprehensive commitment to human freedom such that the ‘end of history’, as Francis 
Fukuyama (1992) so dramatically predicted, is now close at hand? Or has the apparently 
impeccable liberal vision of future progress which underpins – whether implicitly or 
explicitly – the great part of contemporary public discussion already begun to encounter the 
fruit of the long-sown seeds of its own downfall? In a word, has the established vision of 
freedom and justice championed by mainstream Euro-American thought already passed its 
sell-by date? 
2.5 Two faces of liberalism  
In addressing this question, Gray is no enemy of either freedom or diversity. Rather he sets 
out to ask whether this established vision of the good life is really as compatible with cultural 
pluralism as its proponents suggest, or whether, to the contrary, it has been constructed 
around a specific set of cultural values which render many values with others may hold 
equally as unacceptable and ultimately quite intolerable. One does not have to search far to 
find such contradictions. At this point two examples – although both have far-reaching 
consequences – will  have to suffice.  
 
One of the central tenets of contemporary Euro-American thought is that the pursuit of 
personal freedom, and hence of individual autonomy, is a fundamental right, and which 
should – as far as is humanly possible – remain untrammelled by the demands of others, up to 
and including one’s own family members. To those operating within many other cultural 
traditions such expectations are not only unrealistic, but are actively destructive of all 
meaningful social relationships, and most especially of the collective reciprocities of kinship.  
For them, loyalty to the group, and most especially the family, must always out-trump the 
pursuit of personal freedom, for otherwise the mutuality and security of the family (which for 
obvious reasons is normally understood in extended rather than nuclear terms in such 
contexts) will of necessity be undermined. Which of these options is to be preferred? The one 
offers the prospect of almost unlimited personal autonomy, at the necessary cost of 
undermining – and perhaps even eliminating – personal security; the second offers the 
prospect of almost unlimited personal security, but at the equally necessary cost of 
undermining – and perhaps even eliminating – personal freedom. Which of these two 
prospects is the better? Clearly there is no answer: each view has its own merits – and 
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demerits. Ultimately they are incommensurable, like apples and oranges. To an apple lover 
oranges may indeed be fruit, but of a kind which is a very poor substitute for oranges; and of 
course orange-lovers make exactly the same judgement of apples.  
 
Mainline liberal thought also has much the same problem with religion – the phenomenon 
which Marx resoundingly denounced as the opium of the people. Whilst only a minority of 
contemporary Euro-American social philosophers would go that far, the vast majority 
nevertheless take the view that if religion is to play a social role at all, adherence to religious 
principles (whatever they may be) should not only be a matter of personal choice, but also 
that all activities stemming from them should firmly be restricted to the personal and 
domestic sphere. But even if we leave the question of how far this commitment has actually 
been implemented to firmly one side,8 we still need to address a yet wider question still: how 
can religious traditions which impose all manner of public behavioural and ideological 
obligations upon their followers, and in doing so drive a coach and horses through the 
conventional liberal expectation that religious belief and practice should be firmly excluded 
from the public realm, possibly be tolerated. The conventional answer has of course been that 
all we needed to do was to have patience, and these illusory notions would fall into the 
dustbin of history where they properly belonged. However it now seems quite clear that all 
such notions must be firmly abandoned on empirical grounds. First of all, the long-awaited 
disappearance of religion from the public – and above all the political – sphere shows no sign 
whatsoever of taking place: on the contrary if there is one very firm lesson which we can 
draw from the latter half of the twentieth century it is that in every part of the globe, religion 
has become an ever more salient – and may well by now be the most salient – vehicle for 
political mobilisation, and as we enter the new millennium, there is no sign whatsoever of 
any deviance from that pattern. Secondly, and consequently, mainstream liberalism’s self-
proclaimed commitment to toleration appears to have entirely evaporated in the face of these 
developments. Although objective observers could only conclude that the genie has long 
since left the bottle, mainline thinking still proceeds as if the stopper was still very nearly in 
place. One of the central consequences of all this is now all too clear: their much proclaimed 
insistence that only proper place for religion is in the private domain provides the powers that 
                                                 
8  Once one bears in  mind how comprehensively such symbols as the American Flag, the French Republic, and 
most dramatically of all, Lenin’s mausoleum have been publicly fetishised, it becomes extremely difficult to 
take seriously the commitment to laïcité to which all three of these very differently constituted states nominally 
subscribe. However fuller discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
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be with an extremely effective vehicle through which to seek to impose their hegemony over 
followers of those benighted traditions which remain perversely committed to a different set 
of values.  
 
In his closely argued analysis of the Two Faces of Liberalism,  Gray sets out to confront these 
conundrums directly. Taking his cue from Hobbes rather than Locke, he begins by arguing 
that there is no single ideal cultural system on which all humanity has, can or ever could 
reach agreement. Hence  
‘If liberalism has a future, it is in giving up a search for a rational consensus on the 
best way of life … rational inquiry in ethics … shows that the good life comes in 
many varieties. (Gray 2000: 1 – 3) 
The span of good lives of which humans are capable cannot be contained in any one 
community or tradition. The good for humans is too beset by conflict for that to be 
possible. For the same reason, the good life cannot be contained in any one political 
regime.’ (ibid: 6) 
 
Hence he goes on to insist that the most appropriate basis on which to proceed is to abandon 
the search for the chimera of a single ideal regime, liberal or otherwise, to which all can 
adhere. Instead supports Hobbes’ view that the object of toleration is not to lay down the 
foundations for consensus, but instead to promote mutual coexistence in contexts of 
inevitable diversity. Hence: 
 “A theory of modus vivendi is not the search for an ideal regime, liberal or otherwise. 
It has no truck with the notion of an ideal regime. It aims to find terms on which 
different ways of life can live well together. Modus vivendi is liberal toleration 
adapted to the historical fact of pluralism. The ethical theory underpinning modus 
vivendi is value-pluralism. The most fundamental value-pluralist claim is that there 
are many conflicting kinds of human flourishing, some of which cannot be compared 
in value. Among the many kinds of good lives that humans can live there are some 
that are neither better nor worse than one another, nor the same in worth, but 
incommensurably – that is to say, differently – valuable.” (ibid: 6) 
 
Although the resultant condition of cultural pluralism is a de facto reality in virtually all 
contemporary societies, it is scarcely a novel phenomenon. Nor is this state of affairs 
necessarily problematic: in most pre-modern societies resolving such dilemmas, and 
promoting a mutually satisfactory modus vivendi between competing interests of this kind 
was a central component of statecraft. By contrast most contemporary societies – and most 
especially those which proudly identify themselves advanced liberal democracies – regard the 
prospect of being forced to tolerate the presence of value-pluralism within their own 
boundaries profoundly unacceptable. Why should this be so? 
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2.6 The homogenising impetus of conventional forms of liberal democracy 
Bhikhu Parekh takes up this issue quite directly, suggesting that the contemporary vision of 
the modern state – whose roots he traces to the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 – is by its very 
nature strongly committed to the erosion of all public value-differentials amongst its citizens.. 
Hence in contrast to 
“premodern polities which were embedded in and composed of such communities as 
castes, clans, tribes and ethnic groups, (the modern state) has increasingly come to be 
defined as an association of individuals. It abstracts away their class, ethnicity, 
religion, social status, and unites them in terms of their subscription to a common 
system of authority, which is similarly abstracted from the wider structure of social 
relations. To be a citizen is to transcend one’s ethnic-religious and other 
particularities, and to think and act as a member of the political community. Because 
their socially generated differences are abstracted away, citizens are homogenized and 
related to the state in an identical manner, enjoying equal status and possessing 
identical rights and obligations” (Parekh 2000: 181). 
 
But whilst Parekh acknowledges that this individualistic vision of civic participation has 
undoubtedly led to the institutionalisation of a remarkably wide range of positive benefits, 
since it:   
“raises the individual above religious, ethnic and other forms of communal 
consciousness and creates an unprecedented regime of personal liberties and rights. It 
eliminates personalized rule and replaces it with an impersonal system of government 
in which the citizen is subject only to the authority of the law. It establishes equality 
between its members, bypasses the social hierarchies of status, caste and class, and 
nurtures their sense of dignity. It also provides them with an impersonal and enduring 
object of allegiance and loyalty, widens their moral sympathies, creates shared 
citizenship and a space for collective action, and represents the triumph of human will 
over natural and social circumstances….It provides space for personal autonomy and 
cultural and religious freedom. It fosters a sense of community among its otherwise 
unrelated members … and creates conditions for a relatively inviolate private realm, 
an autonomous civil society, and an autonomous public realm governed by publicly 
articulated and debated norms of rationality.” (ibid: 183-184) 
 
Yet this whole magnificent edifice of the  liberal democratic state is simultaneously riven by 
a severe internal contradiction: its deep-rooted expectation that the demos which organizes 
should be – or failing that should become – politically and culturally homogeneous. As 
Parekh argues,   
“This is not a contingent failing or an aberration, but is inherent in the way it has been 
defined and constituted for past three centuries. All its citizens are expected to 
privilege their territorial over their other identities; to consider what they share in 
common as citizens far more important than what they share with other members of 
their religious, cultural and other communities; to define themselves and relate to each 
other as individuals; to abstract away their religious, cultural and other views when 
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conducting themselves as citizens; to relate to the state in an identical manner, and to 
enjoy an identical basket of rights and obligations. In short, the state expects all its 
citizens to subscribe to an identical way of defining themselves and relating to each 
other and the state. This shared political self-understanding is its constitutive principle 
and necessary presupposition. It can tolerate differences on all other matters but not 
this one, and uses educational, cultural, coercive and other means to ensure that all its 
citizens share it. In this important sense it is a deeply homogenizing institution (ibid: 
184)  
 
Why, though, should these expectations be so seriously flawed? The answer should by now 
be clear enough. Whilst states based on such principles may well be extremely effective 
vehicles for engineering good policy and practice in societies which are either culturally 
homogeneous or willing to become so, the whole project can all too easily have precisely the 
opposite consequences if and when it hits the rocks of pluralism:  
In multi-ethnic and multinational societies whose constituent communities entertain 
different views on its nature, powers and goals, have different histories and needs, and 
cannot therefore be treated in an identical manner, the modem state can easily become 
an instrument of injustice and oppression and even precipitate the very instability and 
secession it seeks to prevent (ibid: 185). 
 
Moreover such conditions of cultural pluralism are hardly exceptional: on the contrary they 
were very much the norm in the pre-modern world. Hence the sense of homogeneity around 
which almost all contemporary states are constructed is not only intrinsically fragile, but in 
large part a product of the state’s own efforts to promote and celebrate a vision of its own 
national linguistic and cultural uniqueness. Yet although that sense of uniqueness is 
invariably conceptualised as a ‘bottom-up’ phenomenon, arising in an almost mystical way 
from ‘the people’ themselves, programs of state-formation were in fact much more frequently 
implemented from the top down. It is easy to see why: since the populations living within the 
boundaries of newly crystallising nation states were very often far more linguistically and 
culturally heterogeneous than the new nationalistic ideology suggested that they should be, 
the first task of many newly formed post-monarchical and post-Imperial governments was to 
create the nation which was to be the object of its attentions.9  
 
Much energy has of course been committed to fostering a sense of national coherence and 
integrity, and the outcome of such efforts has been broadly successful – even though they 
have often been vigorously contested by regionalist movements in France, Spain, Italy and 
                                                 
9 As Massimo d’Azeglio remarked on the occasion of the first meeting of the parliament after Italy had been 
united, “We have made Italy; now we have to make Italians’ (Hobsbawm 1992: 44) 
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most spectacularly of all in Yugoslavia. However during the past half century the resultant 
trends towards ever higher levels of cultural and linguistic homogeneity within most 
European nation-states has begun to be confronted with a new and largely unexpected 
challenge. The arrival of an ever-mounting inflow of migrant workers, almost all of whom 
are of extra-European origin.  
 
The result of these processes is now plain to see: far from following a straightforward 
trajectory of cultural assimilation, most settlers – as well as their locally-born offspring – are 
sustaining a strong sense of their own distinctive cultural and religious heritage, whose 
resources have invariably proved to be a valuable source of inspiration in constructing 
strategic responses to the worst consequences of the forces of exclusion to which they so 
routinely find themselves exposed (Ballard 1992). As the new minorities have clustered 
together to create what can best be described as ethnic colonies in the heart of most of 
Britain’s (and Europe’s) major cities (Ballard 1994), it is quite clear that their ever more 
salient – and numerous – presence has raised all the dilemmas highlighted by Gray and 
Parekh right to the top of the socio-political agenda in almost every corner of the Euro-
American world. Moreover these are not contradictions which we can afford to leave 
untouched in the hope that they will be gradually be resolved by normal democratic 
processes. Quite the contrary: for reasons that both Parekh and Gray highlight, they are much 
more likely to blow up in our faces if we fail to address them with a much greater level of 
skill and insight than is currently being deployed.  
2.7 Living with plurality 
Before considering what those skills, as well as the institutional arrangements constructed 
around them might actually consist of, we must first return to basics. In particular, just how 
should we expect face-to-face social relationships be organised in contexts of cultural 
plurality? To those raised with the assumption that religious, cultural and linguistic 
homogeneity is wholly normal, the prospect of a face-to-face encounter with beings drawn 
from an alien order is invariably viewed with considerable alarm. ‘Will they understand me?’ 
‘Will I understand them?’ ‘Are they friends or foes?’ ‘Will I be able to differentiate the one 
from the other?’ are thoughts which will almost inevitably spring to mind in such 
circumstances. But not only are ‘the others’ in such contexts invariably viewed as both 
mysterious and potentially dangerous, there is also a strong tendency to assume that both ‘my 
language and culture’ and ‘their language and culture’ are freestanding, reified and 
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immiscible  entities. The saying ‘East is east and west is west, and never the twain shall meet’ 
points directly to this mode of thinking. 
 
However the most salient feature of all plural societies is that they include a whole series of 
arenas in which those who differ do regularly meet, and successfully interact with one 
another: it is only in comprehensively homogeneous societies that no-one has any experience 
of such transactions, so giving rise to the mistaken illusion that that cross-border transactions 
are somehow unusual, unnatural and unproblematic. Such a reading of what goes on in such 
situations could hardly be more inaccurate. 
2.8 Cultural navigation 
Most human societies are culturally plural: that is they contain within themselves a variety of 
differently constituted social arenas, within each of which a distinctive set of cultural 
conventions are normally deployed. Pluralism in this sense is a commonplace experience: 
there are subtle (and sometimes not so subtle!) differences in the way in which we code our 
behaviour when at home with parents, when sitting in a classroom at school, or when we go 
out clubbing with friends, for example. Since everyone plays different roles in different 
situations, we all of us constantly adapt the ways in which – and very often the cultural codes 
in terms of which – we present ourselves as we navigate our way through the changing 
circumstances of our everyday lives. Hence even in the most nominally homogeneous 
societies our self-presentations (or so called ‘identities’) vary from context to context. 
 
It also follows that the extent of the cultural variations which any given individual encounters 
is profoundly influenced by the social context in which they find themselves. Hence, for 
example, urban lifestyles are normally much more plural than those in rural areas, and the 
population of some cities is a great deal more culturally plural than others. Hence the degree 
of cultural pluralism to which any given individual is exposed can vary enormously: in some 
cases it may be no more than variations on a theme, whilst in others they may find themselves 
exposed to a maelstrom of radically differing traditions. However the main point to remember 
is that cultural pluralism is (and always has been) a routine feature of human social 
organisation; and that multiculturalism – or in other words exposure to, and hence some 
degree of familiarity with, a range of cultural codes is therefore a normal human experience.  
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Human beings are therefore no more necessarily mono-cultural than they are intrinsically 
mono-lingual: are brains are perfectly capable of coping with several differently constructed 
operating systems. Hence just as those exposed to more than one language will quickly 
become bi-lingual, so it also follows that those exposed to more than one culture will likewise 
become bi-cultural. In other words as soon as someone has acquired the requisite degree of 
cultural competence – or in other words the capacity to act and react appropriately in a 
number of differently structured arenas – they will be multicultural; and the greater the 
degree of cultural competence they acquire, the wider will be the range of arenas through 
which they can successfully navigate. Having such a capacity is no more a threat to one’s 
personal integrity than bi-lingualism is a cause of brain-damage. Quite the contrary: those 
with ability to navigate competently through a wide range of cultural and linguistic arenas are 
advantaged, rather than disadvantaged, as compared with those who lack such capacities.  
 
However the rules of cultural hegemony – which insist that certain codes are more advanced 
than, more civilised than and are consequently in all senses superior to all others – blanks out 
awareness of what should be a self-evident truth. This also precipitates a further paradox: 
whilst members of dominant groups tend to be much less linguistically and culturally 
competent than those whom they view as their social inferiors, they invariably find 
themselves hard-pressed to recognise – let alone to ascribe any kind of positive value to – the 
full range of linguistic competences and navigational skills routinely deployed by those 
whom they dominate. Instead such skills and competencies (not that they are normally 
identified as such in the dominant discourse) tend routinely to be used as a mark of 
inferiority.  
 
This by now deeply institutionalised tendency to devalue linguistic and cultural alterity can 
indeed be a source of severe psychological distress. It those subjected a system of 
institutionalised exclusionism which constantly invites them to devalue all aspects of their 
ancestral heritage succumb to those pressures, and hence, for example, try to ‘think 
themselves white’, they will soon find themselves facing the most alarming contradictions. 
Not only do are they thereby required to turn their backs on the entire community – with all 
the benefits of its internal reciprocities – within which they have been raised, but if the 
‘racial’ boundary is congruent with the cultural boundary which they are seeking to cross, 
they must also find some way of denying a very salient component of their very physical 
being. Labelling the resultant psychological confusion ‘culture conflict’ – as very often 
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occurs – is not only erroneous, but almost wholly obscures the real nature of the underlying 
contradictions.10  
 
These contradictions, no matter how severe they may sometimes become, are best understood 
not so much a sign of personal weakness, but rather as an inevitable consequence of over-
exposure to the forces hegemony. The more comprehensively members of excluded groups 
can be persuaded that their own linguistic and cultural heritage – and indeed their own 
physical being – is inferior to that of their dominators, the more comprehensively 
disempowered they will become; and since education is the principal means whereby this 
outcome is achieved in the contemporary world, it is precisely those who are most upwardly 
mobile in educational terms who find themselves most seriously exposed to these 
contradictions. In this context it is worth remembering that the highest form of education lies 
in retaining (or regaining) the capacity to think for oneself. As Biko repeatedly emphasised – 
ultimately at the cost of his life – this is the first and most necessary step towards re-
empowering oneself, and hence of gaining the capacity comprehensively to resist hegemony. 
3 Ethnicity: the construction and maintenance of cultural boundaries 
Whilst the boundaries between arenas ordered in terms of differing cultural codes are readily 
crossable – at least by those who have acquired the relevant cultural competence – such 
boundary-crossing activities do not necessarily lead to an erosion of the boundary between 
the two arenas. Cultural systems have their own situationally adaptive logic, and those who 
use them sustain and revise their contents as suits their purposes, whatever they may be. In 
that sense the boundary which defines the limits of any given cultural arena is far from static. 
Instead it is best understood as a strategic construction whose height and permeability is 
likewise constantly readjusted by those who sustain it (Barth 1969).  
3.1 The dynamics of ethnic polarisation 
In certain circumstances, however, cultural boundaries may be quite deliberately elaborated, 
thus giving rise to a process of ethnic polarization. In most cases it is not so much the depth 
of the cultural difference between the contending parties which drives such processes of 
boundary elaboration, but rather differences in their economic and political interests and 
concerns. The sharper those contradictions become – or at least they are perceived as being – 
                                                 
10 Some of the best insights into the dynamics of these contradictions can be found in the work of  Fanon (1968), 
Memmi (1965 ) and Biko (1987). 
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the more vigorous the resultant processes of ethnic consolidation, and hence of polarization, 
will tend to become.  
 
Hence ethnicity needs to be carefully distinguished from culture. Ethnic consolidation is not a 
product of cultural distinctive per se, but is best understood as the outcome of the articulation 
of cultural distinctiveness in situations of political and/or economic competition. As a result it 
normally erupts in response to patterns of inequality of one form or another. Hence just as 
privileged groups routinely close ranks in ethnic terms to exclude their social subordinates in 
the hegemonic patterns described earlier, so the excluded frequently respond by closing ranks 
themselves, the better to resist and subvert their subordination. When each side reacts in turn 
against the other, the outcome is very often a rapid and escalating process of mutual ethnic 
polarisation.  
 
It follows that ethnic closure is by no means a strategy which is solely pursued by excluded 
minorities. Rather it is a far more general phenomenon: those at the top of the social order 
routinely close ranks in order to sustain their position of privilege; those at the bottom have a 
parallel interest in closing ranks the better to resist the exclusionary pressures to which they 
are subjected; meanwhile those in the middle frequently practice dual closure in an effort to 
keep those below them at bay whilst simultaneously setting out to challenge those more 
privileged than they (Parkin 1979).  In this sense ethnicity adds a crucial additional 
dimension to class theory. Whilst it accepts that social divisions are primarily the outcome of 
dialectic processes of mutual competition for scarce resources, it nevertheless insists that we 
should also acknowledge that cultural symbols – and hence of ethnicity – play a key role in 
way in which the contending parties construct their boundaries and generate a powerful sense 
of moral solidarity amongst all those contained within them. It is precisely that sense of 
solidarity which enables a collection of people to transform themselves from being nothing 
more than an objectively observable social category (‘a sack of potatoes’, to use Marx’s 
graphic phrase) into a subjectively conscious social group whose members can thereby set off 
in active pursuit of their own collective interests. If so, it follows that far from being a 
peripheral phenomenon, ethnicity – and above all processes of  ethnic mobilization – should a 
occupy a far more salient position in sociological theory than most established models have 
hitherto recognized.  
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3.2 The logic of racial and ethnic polarisation 
Not only does this perspective suggest that we should re-examine all conventional accounts 
of social class formation with an eye to the extent to which the dynamics of such processes of 
social mobilisation were underpinned by moral – and hence ethnic – factors, but it also gives 
us an additional analytical edge in terms of which to explore all sorts of contemporary 
conflicts which are currently conflicts which are currently frequently described either as 
‘racial’ or ‘racialised’.  
 
Those terms are most usually deployed when those involved act in what critics hold to be 
wholly arbitrary and indeed irrational fashion by using hereditary characteristics such as skin 
colour as an inescapable marker of both alterity and inferiority, so justifying all manner of 
exclusionary practices directed at those so identified. Given such a vision of the nature of the 
problem, the best way forward would appear to engage in a massive process of re-education 
whose central aim would be expose the irrational character of these judgements, and hence to 
replace rampant prejudice with mutual respect. Yet although these broad objectives are 
clearly wholly well-meant, one still need to ask whether the initial diagnosis was sufficiently 
accurate for the remedy to have any realistic prospect of having the desired effect: after all 
these allegedly irrational beliefs show little or no sign of disappearing no matter how better 
educated we have all become. In the face of all this Wellman has incisively developed an 
alternative approach. Rejecting the concept of prejudice as a mans of getting to grips with 
these processes of exclusion, he argues that white racism is best understood as “a culturally 
sanctioned, rational response to struggles over scarce resources” (Wellman 1977: 35). On 
this basis he goes on to argue that  
“The issues which divide black people and white people are grounded in real and 
material conditions. The justifications for this division have an element of rationality 
to them: they are not simply manufactured reasons, misperceptions or defenses for 
personality defects. In crucial ways they are ideological defenses of the interests and 
privileges that stem from white people’s position in a structure based in part on racial 
inequality.” (ibid: 37) 
 
 What Wellman is arguing, in other words, is that whilst skin colour may be a trigger both for 
social exclusion, as well as for fears that one’s hitherto successful efforts to exclude may 
come under serious challenge in the course of face-to-face interactions with the excluded, the 
underlying rationale of the whole process is in fact much more straightforward: namely to 
preserve one’s own interests and privileges, and to ensure that others do not transgress them. 
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And whilst Wellman sets his argument in the United States, where the principle contradiction 
at the time at which he wrote was between the white majority and the African-American 
minority, it is easy enough to transpose his arguments to contemporary Britain, where 
similarly structured contradictions have now erupted viz-a-viz members of the South Asian 
and Afro-Caribbean minorities, who are currently seen not only as threatening the material 
interests of the indigenous majority by allegedly ‘taking our houses’ and taking our jobs’, but 
also as offering an unacceptable threat to the integrity of Britain’s cultural order.  
 
Is there any substance to such charges? Following Wellman’s line of argument, there clearly 
is – provided that we accept as given the proposition that members of Britain’s indigenous 
population have an inherent right to occupy a position of privilege, and that the only 
legitimate role for those who differ is to act as subservient helots to their betters, eternally 
grateful for being granted access to any crumbs that fall from the table above them. The new 
minorities, reasonably enough, see things differently. They may have begun in such a sub-
proletarian position when they first arrived: newcomers have little alternative but to accept 
the scraps that they offered, no matter how significant an economic role they may be 
fulfilling. However the new non-European settlers had  no more intention of putting up with 
such a position in the longer run than did their Irish and Jewish predecessors who fulfilled 
exactly the same role during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. They aimed to 
move upwards and outwards as soon as possible, and if they themselves were unable – given 
their relatively limited linguistic and cultural competence – to break out of the proletarian 
positions to which they were so routinely ascribed, then they certainly expected their British 
born children to do so. 
3.3 Ethnicity and social mobility 
But exactly how was the objective of upward socio-economic mobility actually to be 
achieved? Although gaining sufficient cultural and linguistic competence such that they could 
fluently participate fluently in English cultural arenas was clearly a necessary prerequisite, it 
soon became quite clear that that was not sufficient: they also had to find some means of 
piercing – or at least circumventing – these deep-seated barriers of ethnic exclusionism which 
were strewn in their path by members of the dominant majority. In successfully doing so, 
three factors appear to have been of particular importance. Firstly a powerful belief that the 
excluders really could be beaten at their own game: or in other words a thoroughgoing 
rejection of hegemonic attempts to persuade the minorities of their own inferiority, such that 
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they were bound to fail no matter how hard they tried. Secondly a willingness to accept the 
view – as their parents insisted – that if the only way to break through was to be twice as 
competent, and twice as well qualified as the competition, then so be it: go for it – and don’t 
allow yourself to be intimidated. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, their ability to 
access what can best be identified as an alternative ethnic ‘backstage’ in Goffman’s sense: the 
rich resources of an alternative of moral, ideological, spiritual, social and conceptual heritage, 
which offered constant inspiration in the process of unexpected devising (and hence highly 
effective) strategies of resistance.  
 
Whilst success was greatest when all three of these factors mutually reinforced each other, 
the last was in many respects the key to the whole process. On the one hand their ethnic 
alterity gave them the confidence not to take no for an answer, and instead to look for chinks 
in the barriers of exclusion through which that might begin to press their way forward; and on 
the other it was the massive resources of both encouragement and mutual support available 
within those ethnic arenas and their attendant networks of reciprocity which enabled them to 
make the most of whatever opportunities they identified, and in so doing to exploit them to 
the full. The results of processes of this kind are now plain to see in most of Britain's major 
industrial towns and cities. Far from fading away into the ethnic mainstream in a process of 
assimilation – as many commentators naïvely expected would occur – the great majority of 
South Asian and Afro-Caribbean settlers who were initially drawn into Britain in the midst of 
the post-war economic boom still live clustered together in more or less tight knit ethnic 
colonies, whose members organise the personal and domestic lives according to values and 
conventions which are still primarily inspired by their ancestral cultural, religious and 
linguistic heritage (Ballard 1994, James 1993).  
 
Given the arguments developed in this chapter, it should be much easier to understand why 
they should have behaved in this way. Such responses are not the outcome of pig-headed 
conservatism, nor of mindless efforts of authoritarian parents to keep their freedom-seeking 
offspring in check: rather they are much better understood as an adaptive – and hence as a 
strategic – response to the circumstances which the users of these cultural conventions have 
encountered, as a result of which there are both utilising and reinterpreting the resources of 
their cultural heritage the better to pursue their own similarly constructed interests and 
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concerns.11 Nor is there anything unique or novel about such processes of ethnic colony 
construction. Careful inspection of the way in which the current crop of minorities’ Irish 
Catholic and eastern European Jewish settlers established themselves in Britain during the 
course of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries soon reveals that they, too, used 
exactly the same strategies (Fielding 1993, Brook 1989) 
 
To be sure there are some very significant differences between these two sets of minorities. 
Because the majority of post-war migrants were of non-European origins, they were visibly 
distinctive. This had far reaching consequences. Not only did their ready identifiability make 
them much easier targets for exclusion, but also rendered any attempt to hide their 
distinctiveness futile; by the same token this also provided fertile ground for constructing 
arguments which suggested that their ‘racial’ alterity was the central issue at stake. However 
this was never the sole cause of contention. In addition to their physical distinctiveness, the 
majority of post-war settlers also brought with them a social, cultural and religious heritage 
which was equally strongly non-European in character. Moreover that dimension of the 
newcomers’ alterity was very soon held to offer just as much, if not more of a threat to the 
integrity of the established social order than did their mere physical distinctiveness – as 
anyone who cares to read Enoch Powell’s ‘racist’ speeches can immediately perceive.  
 
3.4 Ethnicity and social exclusion 
What is frequently forgotten, however, is that popular paranoia about ‘the immigrant threat’ 
which Enoch Powell re-articulated with such success during the course of the late nineteen 
sixties and early nineteen seventies was in no sense a novel phenomenon. Fears about the 
alleged threat offered by the ever-growing presence Irish Catholic settlers during the latter 
part of the nineteenth century and by Eastern European Jews during the early decades of the 
twentieth century were if anything even more intense – even though those settlers physical 
and cultural heritage was European. However this did not prevent exactly the same kind of 
arguments being deployed against them. Not only were both the Irish and the Jews viewed as 
persons of grossly inferior racial stock, but their culture – and above all their determined 
                                                 
11 By way of clarification, I do not wish to suggest that these very rational choices are necessarily consciously 
worked out by those who deploy them. Rather I would suggest that they are an outcome of both commonsense 
(within the context of the commonplace assumptions current within that group) and trial and error. If certain 
strategies and adaptations turn out to work, in the sense of producing manifest benefits, others are likely to 
follow. Such adaptive processes do not require conscious planning.  
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maintenance of a sense of ethnic solidarity – was viewed as plain evidence of their 
conspiratorial purpose. Hence whilst the Irish presence was seen in many quarters as part of a 
dastardly Papist plot to overturn Englishness, Protestantism and the Crown, the Jewish 
presence was seen as part of an equally insidious effort to implement the protocols of the 
Elders of Zion. Both charges were mere paranoid fantasy, of course, but they nevertheless 
served a rational purpose: they could be – and indeed were – routinely utilised to legitimate 
all manner of exclusionary practices against members of both the Irish and the Jewish 
minorities whenever and wherever they were perceived as unwelcome competitors for 
houses, for jobs, for golf club membership or indeed for any other kind of sought after but 
scarce resource.  
 
Yet despite these handicaps – which were often severe – members of both groups have 
achieved a considerable degree of prosperity as the decades have passed. In this respect the 
achievements of the Jews have been particularly spectacular. Having been relegated to the 
position of a comprehensively marginalised sub-proletariat when they first arrived, the 
second generation moved into skilled (but still working class) occupations of one kind or 
another, whilst their successors are by now overwhelmingly concentrated in the upper 
echelons of the social order, either in business or in one or other of the professions. And 
although adept at passing – or in other words at obscuring virtually all overt indications of 
their Jewish heritage – it is certainly not the case that Britain’s Jews have simply disappeared 
into the undifferentiated mass of the population at large. Not only do they still exhibit a 
marked tendency to cluster together in residential colonies within which manifestly 
distinctive personal and domestic lifestyles are still sustained, but the breadth and strength of 
Jewish ethnic networks can only be described as spectacular. But although those reciprocal 
ties serve just the same purpose as do ‘old-boy’ networks amongst the native English, their 
significance is read in a wholly different way: hence extensive efforts are routinely made to 
play them down, and hence obscure their existence.  
 
Bearing all this in mind, the differences between the exclusionary pressures with which 
members of Britain’s Irish and Jewish minorities initially found themselves confronted and 
those into which African, Afro-Caribbean and Asian settlers subsequently ran manifestly 
differed little in their structural character. Indeed there are good reasons for suggesting that 
the arrival of a new set of scapegoats was one of the principal reasons why hostile attitudes 
towards their less visible predecessors declined in force. Secondly, and just as importantly, 
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there are equally strong parallels between the ways in which members of all four groups 
responded to exclusion: all of them clustered together to form mutually supportive networks 
amongst themselves, and from within the relative safety and security of those colonies set 
about utilising the resources of their cultural, religious and linguistic capital – whatever form 
it might happen to take – to build strategies and networks the better to challenge and 
circumvent the obstacles they found themselves confronting. In a word, they have reacted to 
their experience of exclusion by developing strategies of ethnic consolidation, and as a result 
have managed to achieved a far more extensive degree of upward social mobility – although 
this has also been tempered by a great deal of inter-ethnic variation (Modood 1997, Ballard 
1996, 1999) – than most sociological observers had either predicted or expected.  
3.5 Winding and unwinding the dynamics of mutual ethnic closure 
It goes without saying that the actual content of these strategies was far from uniform. Each 
group drew on its own distinctive resources, each of which was product of its members’ own 
specific social and historical heritage, whether as peasant farmers in Punjab, Fukian, the 
Yemen or Nigeria, as the Jamaican and Guyanese heirs of Caribbean systems of enslavement 
and resistance, as Irish peasants with a history of many centuries of resistance to English 
colonialism, or long-suffering Jewish craftsmen fleeing the shtetls of eastern Europe in search 
of better opportunities elsewhere. And precisely because the resources which the members of 
each such group brought are so diverse, the goals which the members of each one have 
sought to implement, the trajectories of adaptation and resistance which they have devised, 
and the speed with which they moved along them have been exceedingly varied. All have set 
about resisting exclusion: but the precise content of the ethnic strategies they have devised 
whilst doing so has as been as diverse as their respective heritages. Whilst all are therefore 
equally ethnic in their alterity, the one thing which these groups are not is homogeneous as 
between themselves.  
 
This also raises a further question, is just the minorities whose strategies it is appropriate to 
identify as ethnic – or should majority reactions to these developments also be identified as 
ethnic? In terms of the definition set out earlier, the answer should now be clear. If ethnicity 
is understood the construction of a collectively self-interested sense of social solidarity which 
is achieved through the articulation of a specific set of cultural symbols, it follows that the 
reaction of Britain’s indigenous majority to the perceived threat posed by all these varied 
competitors for access to positions socio-economic advantage has been equally ethic in 
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character, for even if the native Brits (and especially their dominant ethnic component, the 
English) often still find themselves hard pressed to identify themselves in positive terms, they 
have long found it very much easier to identify what they are not: it is each successive 
minority group’s alterity – physical, cultural, religious and linguistic – which has routinely 
been used to define what Brits are not, such that it is in counter-distinction to such alterity, 
rather than in a positive sense of their own distinctiveness, that the British have been most 
easily able to discern a sense of common meaning, purpose and mutual solidarity. If so it is 
hardly surprising that the sense of collective hostility to the challenges offered by a 
succession of groups who could be defined as enemies within – be they Irish ‘papists’, Jewish 
‘yids’, Afro-Caribbean ‘yardies’ or Pakistani ‘fundamentalists’ – should have been so strong. 
If it is indeed the case that Britain’s English natives have only been able fully to define their 
ethnic boundaries in contradistinction to a convenient set of scapegoats, such an insight 
would certainly illuminate a significant part of the logic and the dynamics of recent ethnic 
confrontations in England’s northern cities.  
3.6 Ethnic polarisation in contemporary Britain 
Although the ethnic tensions which have arisen in the wake of large-scale immigration of 
non-European settlers now regularly precipitate the publication of alarmed – and all too often 
alarmist – headlines in mainland British newspapers, it is worth remembering that a very 
differently grounded but far more violent ethnic conflict has now been raging for well over 
three decades across the Irish sea in Ulster. In this case there are, of course, no genetic 
markers between the two contending parties – and at least to anyone but aficionados 
sophisticated of the local scene – very few cultural ones either; rather it is ideological 
differences with respect to religion affiliation, and consequently as whether the province and 
its population should remain ‘loyal’ subjects of the English Crown, or whether they affiliate 
themselves to the Republic to the South which divides them.   
 
As ever in contexts of ethnic polarisation, these positions not only have a history, but are also 
vehicles for the pursuit of contradictory material interests. The boundaries which contain the 
province were originally drawn up in 1926 to protect the local Protestant population from 
what its members viewed as the wholly unacceptable prospect of Republican, and hence 
‘Papist’ domination that they assumed would be inevitable if they allowed themselves to be 
incorporated in the newly established Irish Free State to the south. But although this 
undoubtedly reflected the democratic wishes of the local Protestant majority, it immediately 
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led to the creation of a permanent local Catholic/Republican who were as fearful of Protestant 
domination as were the Loyalists at an all-Ireland level. Nor were these fears unjustified. In 
the years that followed members of Ulster’s protestant majority made strenuous and largely 
successful efforts to bolster their position of privilege by pressing the province’s Catholic 
minority into a position of systematic political and socio-economic advantage.  
 
However such hegemonic strategies rarely work forever, and in the late 1960s these 
established structures of ethnic inequality began to be challenged by the Civil Rights 
Movement. Such moves were viewed – and continue to be viewed – in wholly contradictory 
ways by most of those standing on either side of the divide. To the Catholic minority, not 
only did challenges to the injustice of Protestant hegemony seem to be wholly legitimate, but 
also to be so unacceptable that it could be appropriate, if necessary, to take extreme measures 
to challenge the Protestant’s pig-headed commitment to eternal domination. By contrast most 
members of the protestant majority took precisely the opposite view: since their opponents’ 
demands appeared to negate everything which their tradition of loyalty to Protestantism, the 
Union and the Crown stood for, it was a wholly unacceptable challenge, for it represented a 
far-reaching threat to the integrity of the established socio-political order. Hence they took 
the view that it was appropriate if necessary, to extreme measures to protect their sacred 
heritages from the revolutionary demands which their opponents were beginning to articulate. 
The result was ‘the Troubles’: a process of  ever-escalating ethnic violence as both sides set 
out to out-trump the other’s increasingly dastardly efforts to defend and advance its own 
position. As this occurred each side also powerfully reinforced its own sense of ethnic 
solidarity, such that in contemporary Ulster there are very few social arenas in which the 
participants’ ethnic status does not out-trump all others.  
 
However the cost of such polarisation – or more specifically the levels of violence which 
were attendant upon it – eventually became so large that all sides began to recognise that it 
was impossible to bear. If there was no prospect of either side winning, then it gradually 
became apparent that the only way forward was to call a truce, and instead begin to search for 
a mutually satisfactory modus vivendi. Of course such a mutually satisfactory solution has 
been extremely difficult to find – and for just the reasons which Gray identified. Firstly all 
concerned had to make substantial sacrifices, and not least by abandoning their previously 
cherished beliefs that there was one correct ideological perspective, be it Catholic and 
Republican or Protestant and Loyalist. Ideological purity had to be abandoned in favour of 
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some messy path of compromise down the middle. Secondly such a compromise was viewed 
as deeply painful, and most especially so to the formerly dominant Protestants: in their view 
compromise was nothing short of a comprehensively sinful surrender to the forces of evil. 
Thirdly the speed at which the necessity for compromise has been recognised has varied 
substantially as between different sections of the population: hence the conflicts of interest 
over such vital issues as access to jobs, schooling, housing and hence ‘territory’ in proletarian 
north-Belfast have become so deep-rooted that neither side has yet been prepared even to 
consider ‘surrender’ to the other, even though the inevitability of compromise has now not 
only been recognised elsewhere in the province, but substantial steps have also been taken to 
towards institutionalising the sharing of both power and privilege across the ethnic divide. 
 
Yet although it should by now be self-evident that a recognition of both the inevitability and 
legitimacy of ethnic pluralism is the only way of containing ethnic conflict, there is little sign 
that that lesson has yet been learned in the United Kingdom’s English heartlands. Here the 
most salient contemporary ethnic division is that between the white natives and the visible 
minorities, and the resultant processes of ethnic polarisation have precipitated periodic 
explosions, almost all of which have promptly been dubbed ‘race riots’. How, though, are the 
underlying tensions to be resolved?  If John Gray’s analytical conclusions are sound, and the 
lessons of Ulster are anything to go by, it follows that although efforts to share knowledge 
across cultural boundaries in an effort to establish a set of common moral values may be an 
impeccably liberal solution, it is most unlikely to cut the mustard. And for very good reason: 
such a moralistic approach does nothing to address the underlying conflicts of interest which 
invariably drive these processes of polarisation. Unless and until it is recognised that is 
indeed the heart of the matter, and that the conflict will only start to be capable of resolution 
when members of the dominant majority accept that they have no alternative but to make 
some substantial concessions to members of hitherto excluded minorities, that processes of 
polarisation will begin to be contained.  
 
In the light of all this the series of reports on the ethnic confrontations in Oldham and 
Bradford which have recently been published by the Home Office (2001a and b) make 
depressing reading. For the authors of these reports, polarisation (‘segregation’ is the term 
which they themselves use) is not so much a symptom, but the principal cause of the 
disturbances which they set out to remedy. Hence in addition to recommending that more 
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public funds should be spend in order to remedy socio-economic deprivation, the authors 
central suggested remedy is largely moralistic: 
‘A civic identity which serves to unite people and which expresses common goals and 
aspirations of the whole community can have a powerful effect in shaping attitudes 
and behaviour. Shared values are essential to give people a common sense of 
belonging regardless of their race, cultural traditions or faith. Positive action must be 
taken to build a shared vision and identity’ (Home Office 2001a:12) 
 
Yet all this sounds as cosy and uncontentious as motherhood and apple pie (although one 
wonders if it would also be seen that way on the streets of North Belfast), just what should 
detailed content of that vision be, and how might it actually be implemented. The report goes 
on to discuss just those issues in the next chapter: 
“We recognise the importance of open and constructive debate about citizenship, civic 
identity; shared values, rights and responsibilities. It is only through having such a 
debate that we will have the basis for bringing together people of different races, 
cultures, and religions in a cohesive society and within cohesive communities. We 
intend that national Government should take the lead in promoting such a debate, and 
we hope that local government will also recognise the need for this dialogue to take 
place at a local level.’ (ibid: 20) 
 
Yet although this opening statement explicitly recognizes the need for debate, and the 
subsequent paragraph openly acknowledges that this will raise all sorts of contentious issues, 
the authors nevertheless take care to nail their liberal flag (in Gray’s first sense) very firmly 
to the mast:  
‘In an open liberal democracy, citizenship is founded on fundamental human rights 
and duties. The laws, rules and practices that govern our democracy; uphold our 
commitment to the equal worth and dignity of all our citizens. We must tackle head 
on racism and Islamophobia. It will sometimes be necessary to confront cultural 
practices that conflict with these basic values, such as those which deny women the 
right to participate as equal citizens. Similarly, it means ensuring that every individual 
has the wherewithal, such as the ability to speak English, to enable them to engage as 
active citizens in economic, social and political life.’  
 
But having thereby spelled out a strongly assimilationist agenda which insists on the 
legitimacy of ‘confronting cultural values which conflict with fundamental human rights and 
the laws, rules and practices that govern our democracy’ the argument promptly backtracks to 
suggest that  
‘Common citizenship does not mean cultural uniformity. Our society is multicultural, 
and it is shaped by the interaction between people of diverse cultures. There is no 
single dominant and unchanging culture into which all must assimilate. The public 
realm is founded on negotiation and debate between competing viewpoints, at the 
same time as it upholds inviolable rights and duties. Citizenship means finding a 
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common place for diverse cultures and beliefs, consistent with our core values.’ (Ibid: 
20) 
 
Sceptical readers might well conclude that this amounts to double-speak, in which the authors 
are desperately seeking to find a way of facing in two contradictory directions at once. But 
whilst it is possible to achieve this at the level of moralistic rhetoric, it is not a recipe for 
coherent policy. The resolution appears on the next page, for having reiterated the proposition 
that segregation is the core problem, Ministerial working party goes on to argue  
While we cannot at present be sure of the full extent of segregation in Britain, there 
are a number of actions which we can begin to take to counter the negative effects of 
segregation, and the associated barriers to choice. We propose that community 
cohesion should be made an explicit aim of Government at national and local 
levels. …. Government policy must promote cross-community relations wherever 
possible – through youth work schools, health and social care provision, regeneration, 
culture and sport.’ (ibid: 21) (Bold in the original) 
 
Yet just how far are these strongly assimilationist (because vigorously anti-segregationist) 
policy proposals likely to work? Once one takes the arguments developed by Gray and 
Parekh aboard, there are good reason for extreme scepticism. However well intentioned these 
proposal may be, they nevertheless wholly overlook four crucial points: 
• the presence of ethnic disjunctions – and hence a strong degree of segregation and a 
consequent absence of comprehensive ‘community cohesion’ – is a routine feature of 
all plural societies 
• such disjunctions are invariably widened if coercive attempts are made  to close them 
up: a recognition of the legitimacy of diversity is a necessary prerequisite for any kind 
of serious progress in public policy 
• cohesion is not to be found in homogeneity, but rather in developing a modus vivendi 
around the least-worst options for all concerned, no matter how seriously this may 
upset the established status quo  
• that such a modus vivendi is only likely to be achieved when formal recognition is 
given to the significance of ethnic diversity in all spheres of public activity: only then 
will members of every component of in our plural society begin to feel that they have 
a valued and meaningful stake is the established social order.  
 
The fact that all this stands radically at odds with current Home Office thinking  should be a 
cause for considerable concern. As a comparison with Ulster immediately demonstrates, it is 
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most unlikely that the politics of mutual ethnic closure – and hence of ethnic polarisation – 
will begin to be unwound in the absence of an explicit recognition the condition of ethnic 
plurality within which all of us now live. A mere search for harmony invariably obscures that 
de facto reality.   
 
Last but not least, there is a further cause for alarm embedded in the Home Office proposals. 
One of the principal concerns of minority groups in unreconstructed plural societies is that 
they get a very poor deal from public services, not just because of low levels of expenditure, 
but also because of a gross lack of ethnosensitivity in both styles and structures of public 
service delivery.12 If policemen, teachers, doctors, nurses and social workers lack the 
requisite cultural competence to set beside their technical and professional skills, they will 
inevitably deliver a less than fully effective service to those who differ. But rather than 
focusing on improving standards of public service delivery – the low quality of which was 
almost certainly a significant factor in precipitating the uprisings which precipitated the 
Report itself – the current government recommendations suggest that a central priority in 
youth work schools, health and social care provision, regeneration, culture and sport must 
now be to promote cross-community relations wherever possible. Such a diversionary agenda 
is most unlikely to produce any improvement in the quality of service delivery to the 
increasingly beleaguered members of Britain visible minority communities. 
4  Conclusion 
Until the relatively recent past few people would have regarded such a compromise as being 
in any way exceptional or alarming. They, too, lived in plural worlds – but they took their 
existence very much for granted. What has changed such that most contemporary observers 
find that prospect so much more challenging?  
 
Ironically enough the very concept of modernity appears to lie at the heart of the problem. 
Not only does it generate an expectation of rapid progress towards social perfection, but it has 
                                                 
12 In this context it is worth remembering that Sir William MacPherson’s defined institutional racism as ‘The 
collective failure of an organisation to provide an appropriate and professional service to people because of their 
colour, culture or ethnic origin. It can be seen or detected in processes, attitudes and behaviour which amounts 
to discrimination through unwitting prejudice, ignorance, thoughtlessness and racist stereotyping which 
disadvantage minority ethnic people.’ (MacPherson 1999: 28). Although MacPherson’s choice of the term 
institutional racism was understandable, in the light of the arguments developed in this Chapter ‘institutional 
lack of ethnosensitivity’ would more accurately identify the phenomenon to which he is pointing. But whatever 
label we use to describe it, deficiencies in service delivery are now proving to be a far more serious source of 
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an inbuilt commitment to homogeneity as a result of the urgent efforts of democratic societies 
dissolve all significant disjunctions within themselves, thus transforming all their citizens into 
a uniform collection of self-conscious social equals, all of which has generated intense 
feelings of hostility to pluralism at anything other than a personal level. Hence it is 
manifestations collective diversity, and its inherent challenge to social homogeneity, which 
modernistic perceptions find most alarming, whilst paradoxically encouraging the blooming 
of a flowers at a more personal level. Everything is possible, always providing that it takes 
place under the legitimising icon of self-realisation.  
 
In sharp contrast with this ideological drive towards institutional homogeneity, everyday 
experience in the contemporary world has become even more diverse than it ever was before. 
Given the ever growing cheapness and efficiency of modern modes of communication, 
people and ideas, let alone goods and services, have begun to move around the globe at an 
ever increasing speed. The resulting changes are coming thick and fast. Whilst  
industrialisation has always been associated with labour migration, the exhaustion of all 
nearby reservoirs of unskilled labour, the demographic crisis resulting from the simultaneous 
impact of greater longevity and reduced fertility throughout the Euro-American world, the 
ever widening rift in living standards as between the predominantly Euro-American 
metropolis and its predominantly non-European periphery, means that pressures on the 
borders are becoming increasingly intense. But at the same time it is becoming increasingly 
apparent that it is impossible to construct borders which are wholly impermeable to migrant 
entrepreneurs’ efforts to penetrate the boundaries of the ‘free’ world. As a result all societies 
are becoming increasingly plural, and are set to become yet more so as the future unfolds.  
 
As the contradictions precipitated by these developments grow clearer by the day, so the need 
to find a resolution has become ever more pressing. Locking ourselves up in castles of 
privilege would not only entail cutting off our noses to spite our faces, but will also steadily 
undermine our own deepest values. A commitment to freedom, justice and equality cannot be 
sustained in a radically polarised world.  
 
Yet the answer to these conundrums is not hard to discern. There is no future whatsoever in 
the idle expectation that everyone can be forced to fit the same mould, thereby eliminating all 
                                                                                                                                                        
disadvantage to people of colour than straightforward racial discrimination. 
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those uncomfortable disjunctions. That is the source of the problem not is solution. Rather we 
need to adopt precisely the opposite course. It is only by learning to respect – and above all to 
live with – difference, no matter how great that difference may be that we are likely to make 
any significant progress. Our ancestors found it easy to operate as cultural navigators, and 
were very much more skilled in that art than most of the indigenous inhabitants of 
contemporary Euro-America. By contrast those whom they so systematically seek to 
marginalise have for the most part much more actively retained those skills – and on that 
basis are beginning to mount all manner of challenges to the hegemonic structures with which 
they find themselves confronted. So long as those who occupy positions of relative privilege 
continue to react to those challenges with a mixture of fear and paranoia, and take the view 
that the only possible response is to close ranks to keep the alien intruders at bay, polarisation 
will continue to deepen, and we will all face an increasingly uncertain future.  
 
But there is an alternative. If only those in positions of privilege – whether at a local, national 
or a global level – could step back from their current demands that all transactions should be 
done on their own preferred terms, much would change. If only they could only begin to 
comprehend, and indeed participate in, other people’s cultural worlds, whilst also being 
prepared to share the world’s available scarce resources on a much more equitable basis, we 
could all begin to sleep much more easily in our beds. The issue here is ultimately much more 
a matter of self-interest than of morality. Either we learn to hang together in all our 
differences through a continuous search for mutually satisfactory patterns of modus vivendi -  
we will all most assuredly hang apart.  
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